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The Shaw Claim: The Rise and Fall of Colorblind
Jurisprudence
Molly P. Matter*
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.1
−Amendment XV, Section 1, United States Constitution

INTRODUCTION:
Justice is not blind, nor should it aspire to be. Our training as legal
professionals demands that we apply the law to the facts and produce the
decision. However, facts come in the form of narrative, of storytelling–
framed, clothed, dressed in skin.
Jurisprudence is never objective, nor does it stand isolated from cultural
and politico-economic influences of the day. In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme
Court used colorblind theory to allow white voters Article III standing to
allege a voting rights claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

* Molly Peach Matter is a voting rights and human rights attorney based in King County,
WA. Matter formerly served on the National Voting Rights Advocacy Initiate under
Joaquin G. Avila at Seattle University School of Law. Matter is Chair of the Civil Rights
Law Section of the Washington State Bar Association, founder of a community lawyering
practice, Amend Law LLC, and co-counsel in Higginson v Becerra, a recent constitutional
challenge to the California Voting Rights Act.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. This article is in tribute to Joaquin G. Avila, who
envisioned and laid out an extensive roadmap–for Congress, the judiciary, local
jurisdictions, voting rights advocates and the general body politic–for the next
Reconstruction. Our path forward begins with the Guarantee Clause, and its express
guarantee of a Republic, as well as with the Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871 and Civil Rights
Act of 1875. Joaquin Avila’s prophetic knowledge guides three generations of voting rights
lawyers, and I was honored to become one of them. He believed in liberty as the ability of
anyone and everyone to reach their fullest human potential within a politically integrated
society. I also want to acknowledge Joanna Cuevas Ingram for her valuable critique in
drafting and guidance in research.
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Protection Clause.2 The basic facts that prompted Shaw v. Reno are simple:
after the 1990 census, North Carolina had redistricted and created majorityminority districts in an effort to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act
(VRA).3 White voters, backed by strong partisan support, challenged the very
districts that were created to give black voters an equal opportunity to elect
their preferred candidate.

2

See Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (“Racial gerrymandering, even
for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters—a goal that
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to
aspire.”).
3
North Carolina was responding to the 1982 amendments to the federal Voting Rights
Act (VRA) that changed the standard of proof for a voting rights violation. Congress
passed the 1982 amendments in response to Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), a
decision that required proof of discriminatory intent. After the 1982 VRA amendments,
voters could prove a violation of their right to vote based on impact rather than intent alone.
See 1982-Pub. L. 97–205. Section 2 is permanent and has no expiration date:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of
the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of the
guarantees set forth in section 10303(f)(2) of this title, as provided in subsection
(b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or
election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation
by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members
have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political
subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class
elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 439 (1965). Post Shelby County
v Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was codified at 52 U.S.C. §
10301.
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Shaw v. Reno was born in North Carolina at the time when white voters
held voting majorities in 83% of congressional districts, when ten out of
twelve districts were majority-white districts.4 Since 1898, during
Reconstruction, North Carolina had failed to elect a single African American
representative to Congress, although 22% percent of its population was of
African descent.5
After the 1990 Census, North Carolina gained a seat in Congress, and in
response, the state packed a district with majority African American
constituents in hopes of complying with the VRA. Since North Carolina was
covered under federal preclearance6 due to its history of racial violence and
voting rights discrimination, the Department of Justice (DOJ) reviewed the
redistricting map. The DOJ rejected the map, finding that two districts, not
just one, could be majority-minority districts to ensure African Americans
would have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and to
elect a representative of their choice.7 North Carolina then created two
4

See Frank R. Parker, Shaw v. Reno: A Constitutional Setback for Minority
Representation, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 47 (1995).
5
Parker, supra note 4, at 47.
6
Between 1965-2013, states and jurisdictions found to have a history of racially
discriminatory voting practices and laws were under federal preclearance/coverage: before
such covered jurisdictions could renew existing law or implement any change related to
voting, they had the burden to prove 1) that the change would not disparately impact
members of a protected class and 2) that the change was not enacted with discriminatory
intent or purpose. This coverage triggering formula was struck down in Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). Currently, H.R. 4, 116th Cong. (2019), proposes a new
triggering coverage formula and is before the House of Representatives with 225
cosponsors, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/4/text
[https://perma.cc/7XSX-VFS6].
7
The terms “minorities” and “communities of color” as well as “race” and “color” are
used interchangeably although this article focuses predominantly on impacted African
American and Latinx voters. The terms “black” and “African American” are also used
interchangeably to describe people of African descent. The terms “Minority,” “Race,” and
“Color” are common usage in federal case law. For a definition of race, see DOROTHY
ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE
RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2011). Roberts explains the social construct of
race is a European invention to create and enforce a social hierarchy that has no biological
basis; see also Mark Leviton, Not So Black and White: Dorothy Roberts on the Myth of
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majority-minority districts, First and Twelfth Districts, to comply with the
VRA. The DOJ accepted that district map.8
The General Assembly shaped the Twelfth District like a massive winding
snake basking 160 miles along the state highway, intersecting ten counties in
an industrialized corridor connecting North Carolina’s largest cities of
Durham, Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte. The record of the
General Assembly map drawers suggested it was designed to protect
Democratic incumbents.9 The district was 53% African American. With two
majority-minority districts, black legislators Eva M. Clayton and Melvin L.
Watt were elected to Congress. White voters reacted to the election of the
first black representatives in nearly a century by filing a federal lawsuit
attacking the Twelfth District that elected Representative Melvin Watt.
Why return to Shaw v. Reno in 2020? For the past three decades, the
principles of Shaw v. Reno have supported a movement to dismantle our most
revered human rights legislation, the federal Voting Rights Act and the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. This movement was foreseen by a
watershed of scholarship proceeding Shaw v. Reno on its absence of a
coherent legal theory of injury to justify standing, its unprecedented factual
vacuum, and its perverse distortion of the Equal Protection Clause.10
Race, THE SUN MAGAZINE (Apr. 2019), https://www.thesunmagazine.org/issues/520/notso-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/9D5L-CTBT].
8
Parker, supra note 4, at 49.
9
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Neimi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 491–92 (1993) (hereafter Expressive Harms).
10
See, e.g., J. Morgan Kousser, Shaw v. Reno and the Real World of Redistricting and
Representation (California Institute of Technology, Social Science Working Paper No.
915, 1995) [hereafter Kousser, Real World]; Conference, The Supreme Court, Racial
Politics and The Right to Vote: Shaw v Reno and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 44
AMER. U. L. REV. 1 (1994); Frank R. Parker, Shaw v. Reno: A Constitutional Setback for
Minority Representation, 28 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 47 (1995); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela
S. Karlan, Standing and Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 22762292 (1998); Brenda Wright & Bruce Fein, Voting Rights: Is race-conscious districting to
achieve minority representation constitutional?, 79 ABA J., 44-45 (1993); Samuel
Issacharoff, The Constitutional Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45
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With the rise of presidential lawlessness; 11 a surge of voter suppression
laws;12 a sharp increase in hate crimes against communities of color,
(1995); Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single- Member Districts,
1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 205 (1995); Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map: The Supreme
Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 245 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, The Fire
Next Time: Reapportionment After the 2000 Census, 50 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1998); Pamela
S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB.
L. REV. 287 (1996); T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and
Redistricting: Drawing Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588
(1993); Shavar Jeffries, Colorblind Faith: Process Theory, Ely and Standing for White
Voters in Shaw v. Reno, 16 NAT’L BLACK L. J. 169 (1998); KOUSSER, COLORBLIND
INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND
RECONSTRUCTION (University of North Carolina Press, 1999) at 385.
11
Robert S. Muller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016
Presidential Election, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Mar. 2019, available at
https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RS93-W55Z]; see also
Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib, and Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and
Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. (2019); Chairman Jerrold Nadler, Nadler Floor Statement
in Support of Resolution Authorizing Next Steps in House Impeachment Inquiry, Press
Release, U.S. H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Oct. 31, 2019).
12
Data from the federal Elections Assistance Commission reveal that 17 million voters
have been purged between 2016-2018, all from jurisdictions that have a history of voter
discrimination. Kevin Morris, Voter Purge Rates Remain High: Analysis Finds, Opinion
and
Analysis,
BRENNAN
CTR.
FOR
JUSTICE,
available
at
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/voter-purge-rates-remainhigh-analysis-finds [https://perma.cc/LND5-TJXP]; see also Evidence of Current and
Ongoing Voting Discrimination: Hearing Before the Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th
Congress (September 10, 2019) (statements of Derrick Johnson, Vanita Gupta, J. Christian
Adams, Dale Ho, Myrna Perez, Natalie A. Landreth), available at
https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/evidence-current-and-ongoing-votingdiscrimination [https://perma.cc/4WUT-LBDY]; see NAACP v. Hargett – 3:19-cv00365 (filed 2019), LWV AZ v. Reagan – 2:18-cv-02620 (filed 2018); MOVE v.
Whitley – 5:19-cv-000743 and 3:19-cv-00041 (filed 2019); CCNY v. Brehm – 1:1706770 (filed 2017); Curling v. Raffensperger – 1:17-cv-02989 (filed 2017); O’Neil v.
Hosemann – 3:18-cv-00815 (filed 2018); Jones v. Torres (2018); LA State Conf. of the
NAACP v. LA – 3:19-cv-00479 (filed 2019); Thomas v. Bryant – 3:18-cv-00441 (filed
2018); Alabama State Conference of the NAACP v. State of Alabama – 2:16-cv00731(filed 2016, awaiting decision); PACEI – LC v. DHS and DOJ – 1:18-cv-00167
(filed 2018); City of San Jose v Ross – 3:18-cv-02279 (filed 2018); Brooks v. Dept. of
Commerce – 2:18-cv-00772 (filed 2018). Since 2010, 25 states have passed voting
restrictions. Fourteen states had new voting restrictions in place for the first time in the
2016 presidential election: Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. Of those fourteen states, seven were formerly covered by Section 5 of the VRA.

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

29

30

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

immigrants, and sexual minorities;13 human rights abuses against refugee
children;14 and the ever-present reckoning of climate change and

See Brennan Ctr. for Justice, New Voting Restrictions in America (Oct. 1, 2019), available
at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/201911/New%20Voting%20Restrictions.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR68-RPLY].
13
Hate Crimes and the Rise of White Nationalism: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary,
116th
Cong.
(2019),
available
at
https://judiciary.house.gov/legislation/hearings/hate-crimes-and-rise-white-nationalism
[https://perma.cc/38UA-MN9L] (statement of Witness, Kristen Clarke, President and
Executive Director, Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, available at
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU00/20190409/109266/HHRG-116-JU00-WstateClarkeK-20190409.pdf) [https://perma.cc/8TM8-7HKP]; see HUM. RTS. WATCH, WORLD
REPORT
2019,
at
619
(2019),
available
at
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/world_report_download/hrw_world_report_2019.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2XST-RUHQ]; see Simon Romero, Caitlin Dickerson, Miriam
Jordan and Patricia Mazzei, ‘It Feels Like Being Hunted’: Latinos Across U.S. in Fear
After
El
Paso
Massacre,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/06/us/el-paso-shooting-latino-anxiety.html
[https://perma.cc/JZ27-TU8G].
14
The Trump Administration ordered the United States to withdraw from the forty-seven
member UN Human Rights Council, the first country ever to do so. See Nick CummingsBruce, U.N. Rights Chief Tells U.S. to Stop Taking Migrant Children From Parents, N.Y.
TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europe/trumpmigrant-children-un.html [https://perma.cc/H2ZE-J9SR]; see Letter from the United
Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN experts to US: “Release
migrant children from detention and stop using them to deter irregular migration,”
(Geneva,
June
22,
2018)
available
at
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23245&Lang
ID=E [https://perma.cc/2SFB-VA57]; see Colleen Kraft, President, American Academy of
Pediatrics, APP Statement on Executive Order on Family Separation, June 20, 2018,
available
at
https://www.aap.org/en-us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/AAPStatement-on-Executive-Order-on-Family-Separation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8FMY75FA]; see Chantal Da Silva, Trump Administration Accused of Ignoring U.N. Requests
for
Access
to
U.S.-Mexico
Border,
NEWSWEEK
(Mar.
18,
2019),
https://www.newsweek.com/trump-administration-accused-denying-united-nationsmigrants-human-rights-1366084 [https://perma.cc/UE9U-5AGU]; see Steven Wagner,
Acting Assistant Secretary Administration for Children and Families, U.S. Dept. of Health
and Human Services, Statement Before Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate (April 26, 2018); see also
Matthew Haag, Thousands of Immigrant Children Said They Were Sexually Abused in
Immigration Detention Centers, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/us/immigrant-children-sexual-abuse.html
[https://perma.cc/2GEU-HAGX].
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capitalism15–now, more than ever–it’s time to examine the causes and
conditions that got us here. To do so, we must first acknowledge and then reevaluate the underlying judicial principles that no longer serve us and
actively work injustice–one of which is colorblind theory.
This article reconsiders colorblind theory’s efficacy and demands further
reformulation and reexamination. Section I of this article addresses Shaw v.
Reno’s historical, political, and economic context. Section II examines how
the legal strategy of a deracialized narrative and colorblind theory captured
the unexamined minds of the judiciary. Section III challenges the premise
that using race and color to determine election methods and district lines
“threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race
no longer matters”16 and explores the Supreme Court’s theory of political
integration. Section III presents Shaw v. Reno’s factual vacuum and
aspirational colorblind narrative juxtaposed with the massive factual
investigations required of federal voting rights claims. Section IV draws a
line from Plessy v. Ferguson17 to Shaw v. Reno to present-day litigation that
advances colorblind theory. Section IV also examines jurisprudence severed
from the hallowed ground of data. Section V lays a foundation for colorconscious jurisprudence offered by Supreme Court dissents of Justices
Brennan, White, Blackmun, Stevens, Marshall, and Souter, which envision a
15

See Noam Chomsky, The Economics of Climate Change, Climate Change: Catalyst or
Catastrophe?, 16 RP&E JOURNAL 12, (2009)
https://www.reimaginerpe.org/files/Chomsky.Climate.16-2-2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3EVU-HVEF]; Nathaniel Rich, The Next Reckoning: Capitalism and
Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES MAG., The Climate Issue (Apr. 9, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/09/magazine/climate-changecapitalism.html [https://perma.cc/FQB3-VZ2M]; Coral Davenport, Major Climate
Report Describes a Strong Risk of Crisis as Early as 2040, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/climate/ipcc-climate-report-2040.html
[https://perma.cc/HYB7-USD6]; Maggie Astor, Environmental Justice Was a Climate
Forum Theme. Here’s Why, N.Y. TIMES (Sep. 5, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/politics/environmental-justice-climate-townhall.html [https://perma.cc/9MY6-HBFA].
16
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657.
17
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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judicial evolution to reformulate the unfit principles of colorblind theory.
That section demands the critical need to raise the judicial level of
consciousness, and develop new jurisprudence founded in strengthening the
body politic and advancing democratic principles through race-conscious
remedies. Given the 2016-2020 political climate that has emboldened white
nationalism, these important dissents can provide a roadmap back to the
original intent, purpose, and application of the Fourteenth Amendment.

I: THE ORIGINS OF SHAW
“The price one pays for pursuing any profession or calling is an
intimate knowledge of its ugly side.”
−James Baldwin
1982 Senate Hearings Changed the Standard of Proof for Vote Dilution
Shaw was decided at a time when Congress was grappling with how to
deal with one of the many vestiges of slavery and white supremacy: 18 vote
dilution. A common tactic of political warfare for incumbents, particularly
white Southerners before and after the enactment of the Voting Rights Act
(VRA) in 1965 was diluting a community’s electoral power through packing
(i.e., concentrating minority voters into a single district) or cracking (i.e.,
dividing minority voters into several districts).19
18

See ROBIN DIANGELO, WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WHITE: DEVELOPING WHITE
RACIAL LITERACY 146 (New York, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc. 2016). White supremacy
is the term “used to capture the all-encompassing centrality and assumed superiority of
people defined as white, and the practices based on this assumption,” independent of
personal intentionality and will. See Demerris R. Brook-Immel & Susan B. Murray, ColorBlind Contradictions and Black/White Binaries: White Academics Upholding Whiteness,
39 HUMBOLDT J. SOC. RELATIONS 315, 316 (2017) (“White supremacy… exists as
institutional structure-in-process, the effects of which are experienced by both victims and
benefactors of that supremacy…. As an ideological and institutional structure, it is a
complex web of discourses and processes that sustain racial domination.”).
19
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF THE
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 233-234 (Basic Books, 2009) (“If the federal
government insisted on black enfranchisement, conservative southerners would attempt to
vitiate its consequences by altering the structures of representation.”). Gomillion v.
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The use of “at large” rather than single-district election methods (e.g., in
city council or school board elections) has also been an effective strategy to
monopolize political power and dilute the minority vote.20 Once terrorism
through mob-controlled public lynching and suppression through voter
registration requirements—i.e., poll taxes, literacy tests, residency
requirements—were officially outlawed and the Department of Justice was
authorized to enforce the VRA under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,
the wealthiest could still win playing by race-neutral rules through the art of
vote dilution.21 However, when the effects of vote dilution were expounded
upon in Senate hearings during the 1982 VRA reauthorization and states had
to heed the call to comply with new standards of enforcement, white voters
in Shaw devised a narrative strategy to challenge the Court’s interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment as it related to the fundamental right to vote.

Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), exemplified white supremacist tactics to dilute the vote of
African American voters. In Gomillion, “the state legislature completely redrew the city’s
[Tuskegee, Alabama] boundaries, creating a bizarre twenty-eight-sided municipality with
an almost entirely white population: blacks found themselves consigned to surrounded
counties, where they lacked the numbers to wield much influence.”); Id at 233.
20
Id. “Whites could maintain a monopoly of political power by having all city council
members elected “at-large” rather than from single-member districts.” See Allen v. State
Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969), which consolidated several cases that originated
in Mississippi and Virginia, one of which involved a shift to at-large elections in order to
dilute the black vote.
21
Two forms of commonly used vote dilution tactics were underpopulating state
legislative districts to dilute the strength of communities of color in Congress and changing
to at-large election methods. See Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965); Burns v.
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 142-144 (1971);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973) (involving the dilution of Latinx and black
voters through the use of at-large elections in Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, and Texas). These
decisions rendered at-large elections constitutionally suspect. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964), and White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), were based on population
deviation within legislative districts. To emphasize the point of equally populated
legislative districts, the Supreme Court stated, “people, not land or trees or pastures, vote.”
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 580. White v. Register explored a standard for population deviation:
the state would have to justify reason for deviation if it was greater than 10%.
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Mobile v. Bolden to Thornburg v. Gingles: From the Impossible Task of
Proving Purposeful Discrimination to Legislative Transformation
After the federal Voting Rights Act passed in 1965, the federal circuit
courts and the Supreme Court began to hear cases based on overt and subtle
racial discrimination.22 However, as voting rights cases increased, so did the
perpetrator’s tactics on defending corporate white supremacy. In Mobile v.
Bolden,23 the Court created an unbearable threshold to access the Voting
Rights Act: plaintiffs would need to prove deliberate racially discriminatory
intent.24 The inability to prove “racism” was a death knell for the Voting
Rights Act, and states under federal preclearance were relieved by the
decision in Mobile.25 In response, a team of voting rights litigators and
scholars fled to Washington, D.C. to educate legislators on the unbearable
burden of Mobile and successfully amended the federal VRA. 26 The 1982
Amendment to the VRA established that a plaintiff could also prove a
violation by discriminatory impact or effect, similar to Griggs v. Power Co.27
The federal Voting Rights Act was successfully defended by the heroism of
a small but fierce group of voting rights attorneys.28 The first case to apply
the new standard was Thornburg v. Gingles,29 the pinnacle voting rights case

22

See, e.g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980).
24
Id.
25
Federal preclearance covered the entire states of Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, two townships in Michigan, two
counties within South Dakota, four counties within California, five counties within Florida,
five counties within New York, and 40 counties within North Carolina. Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1985).
26
Author interview with Barbara Phillips, Apr. 2, 2019. See S. Rep. No. 97-417, p. 58,
63, 106-7, 193, 196, 221, 223, 226-27, 235-37, 239-40, 248, 253-55, 258, 262, 267-8, 272,
274, 279-280 (1982) [hereinafter S. Rep].
27
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (holding that Title VII “proscribes not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation”).
28
See, e.g., the works of Joaquin G. Avila, Frank Parker, Barbara Phillips, Lani Guinner,
Armand Derfner, Laughlin McDonald, Vilma Martinez, Antonia Hernandez and
others; Phillips supra note 26.
29
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 30.
23
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to this day that provides a pragmatic approach to applying the effects test. 30
In Gingles, “the intent test was repudiated for three principal reasons—it
[was] ‘unnecessarily divisive because it involve[d] charges of racism on the
part of individual officials or entire communities,’ it place[d] an ‘inordinately
difficult’ burden of proof on plaintiffs, and it ‘ask[ed] the wrong question.’” 31
On the horizon, redistricting after the 1990 Census would be the testing
ground of the new threshold. For the first time, covered jurisdictions would
have to answer to the 1982 Amendment that allowed plaintiffs to bring claims
based on discriminatory effect or impact. Defending jurisdictions would have
to apply the Gingles doctrine.32 The stakes were high.
Redistricting after the 1990 Census resulted in a sea change to the racial
composition of the local and federal government as covered states sought to
comply with the VRA. Majority-minority legislative districts between 1990
and 1993 doubled nationwide, which resulted in a 50% increase in the
number of African American representatives and a 38% increase of Latinx
30

See id., at 44.
Id.; see, e.g., S. Rep., supra note 26, at 2, 15-16, 27-29, 36 (“The ‘right’ question, as the
Report emphasizes repeatedly, is whether ‘as a result of the challenged practice or structure
plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to
elect candidates of their choice.’”).
31

The Senate Committee found that ‘voting practices and procedures that have
discriminatory results perpetuate the effects of past purposeful discrimination…
As the Senate Report notes, the purpose of the Voting Rights Act was ‘not only
to correct an active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right
to register and vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination.’
Id. at 9 (quoting 111 Cong. Rec. 8295 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Javits)).
32
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48, n.15:
“Under a ‘functional’ view of the political process mandated by § 2, S.Rep.,
at 30, n. 120, the most important Senate Report factors bearing on § 2 challenges
to multimember districts are the ‘extent to which minority group members have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction’ and the ‘extent to which voting
in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.’”
Id. at 28-29.
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representatives in Congress.33 In 1992, seventeen black legislators were
elected to Congress, more than in any previous decade in congressional
history and the most ever in any single election.34 State legislatures also
transformed with an increase in majority-minority redistricting—most
notably in Louisiana where African American legislators increased by 60%,
from nineteen to thirty-one representatives.35
The advancement of legislators of color representing communities of color
within the United States Congress (though nowhere near proportional
representation) resulted in a white supremacist backlash. White voters filed
federal lawsuits in North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Texas, and Louisiana,
alleging that the creation of majority-minority districts violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.36 This historical and
political context was the birthplace of Shaw.

II: THE VALUE AND CURRENCY OF COLORBLINDNESS
“Racism is really just a mask for greed.”
−Alice Walker
White plaintiffs in Shaw were not injured, not racially discriminated
against, not denied their right to vote, and their vote was not diluted.
Therefore, they would have to bypass Article III standing requirements to
pursue an Equal Protection claim and upend Supreme Court precedent to
pursue a Section 2 Voting Rights Act claim. White voters first filed a partisan
gerrymandering claim, but this claim was dismissed by a 12(b)(6) motion for
failure to state a claim because the white voters could not prove that the plan
33

See Frank R. Parker, Shaw v. Reno: A Constitutional Setback for Minority
Representation, 28 POL. SCI. & POL. 47, 47 (1995); see also U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1993.
34
The Historiography of Black Americans in Congress, History, Art and Archives, U.S.
House
of
Rep.,
available
at
https://history.house.gov/historiography.aspx
[https://perma.cc/E9BN-EMNK].
35
Id.
36
Id.
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had a requisite discriminatory effect on a political group. 37 Without any
viable arguments remaining, how could white plaintiffs in Shaw win? Shaw
plaintiffs went back to the drawing board to invent a different legal theory:
that by factoring race in redistricting, North Carolina had violated their
“aspiration of the Fourteenth Amendment” which they touted to be the
principle of colorblindness.38 The plaintiffs also claimed to speak for all
North Carolinians of every race.39 To be clear, there was no injury in fact, no
causal link, and therefore, no means to redress the phantom injury.
Only one year prior to Shaw, the Supreme Court ruled in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife40 that appellants must prove an actual or imminent
concrete and particularized injury that affects them in a personal and
individual way.41 Such injury could not be hypothetical or abstract or a
37

White Republican voters first filed a partisan gerrymandering claim because District 12
was initially drawn to protect Democratic incumbents and pack African Americans. See
Kousser, Real World, supra note 9, at 56-57.
38
See id. Plaintiffs alleged North Carolina had infringed their right “to participate in a
process for electing members of the House of Representatives which is color-blind and
wherein the right to vote is not abridged on account of the race or color of the voters.” Id.
Amicus briefs in support of white plaintiffs filed by North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms,
Washington Legal Foundation, and the Equal Opportunity Foundation declared that whites
were disenfranchised since the number of legislative districts controlled by whites at the
time decreased – from twelve out of twelve to ten out of twelve districts. Jesse Helm’s ran
on an anti-affirmative action platform with infamous television ads advancing colorblind
theory. The “white hands” ad showed a white man crumpling up a rejection letter that
stated a minority had been offered the job instead. See Jesse Helms “Hands” ad, YOUTUBE
(Oct.
16,
2006),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk
[https://perma.cc/4GMP-7FPL]; In another campaign ad, Helms stated, “[r]acial
gerrymandering by placing the state’s stamp of approval on the notion that people of
different races are inherently different from one another – is a giant step backward from
our goal of a color-blind society.” KOUSSER, supra note 10, at 382.
39
KOUSSER, supra note 10, at 380-383. White plaintiffs’ lawyer, Robinson Everett,
argued that he also represented black voters and that black voters would receive no benefit
from a majority-minority district because such a district would imply that black voters as
a group could not look beyond race when considering its preferred candidate.
40
504 U.S. 555 (1992).
41
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
“Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

37

38

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

generalized grievance. Lujan, to this day, is the model standard for Article III
standing for individual plaintiffs and appellants.42 To bypass judicial standing
precedent, white voters intentionally left out the fact that they were white and
argued they had a constitutionally cognizable injury, one that resulted from
the ideas expressed through a governmental action.43 The District Court for
the District of Columbia had to take judicial notice of the fact that voters were
white, alleging a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection injury, because
nowhere in their complaint did they state their racial identity. 44 Plaintiffs
argued that by focusing on race in drawing the Twelfth District, the General
Assembly had harmed white voters’ conjectural aspirations of what the
Fourteenth Amendment should stand for. Scholars grappling to find a
coherent and cognizable legal theory to justify Shaw have used the term
“expressive” injury or “non-instrumental” injury to explain their injury: how
a “government action [that] expresses disrespect for relevant public values
can violate the Constitution.”45 Which values did North Carolina disrespect
suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized…and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’
or ‘hypothetical’… Second, there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be ‘fairly. . . trace[able]
to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court.’… Third, it must be
‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by
a favorable decision.’”
Id.
42

Standing jurisprudence has, however, expanded in the realm of state injury (versus
personal injury) to account for the imminent harm of global climate change. See
Massachusetts v. Envtl. Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
43
See, e.g., Pildes & Niemi, supra note 8, at 506-07.
44
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 638. Similarly, Higginson v. Beccera involves a white voter who also
omitted his racial identity and based his complaint on colorblind theory to allege an injury.
No. 17cv2032-WQH-MSB (Feb. 4, 2019).
45
See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 8, at 506-07 (“One can only understand Shaw, we
believe, in terms of a view that what we call expressive harms are constitutionally
cognizable. An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed
through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or material
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by attempting to the comply with the federal Voting Rights Act? The values
the General Assembly disrespected when it used race as a predominant factor
in redistricting was the value of an ahistorical colorblind society. It was not
the value of racial equality.
When Justice Harlan delivered his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson,
“[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes
among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law,” Harlan spoke to oppose the majority decision legalizing segregation
and to expose the lie of separate but equal.46 He used the term “colorblind”
to demand color-conscious justice to the inhumane vestiges of slavery. One
hundred years later, when white plaintiffs appealed to the judiciary’s desire
for colorblind principles, it was not to demand racial equality but to subvert
the values of equality and fight to hold onto the status quo of a white ruling
meritocracy.47

consequences the action brings about. On this view, the meaning of a governmental action
is just as important as what that action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution
not only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning they
convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public values. On this unusual
conception of constitutional harm, when a governmental action expresses disrespect for
such values, it can violate the Constitution.”)
46
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan J. dissenting).
47
K. SUE JEWELL, FROM MAMMY TO MISS AMERICA AND BEYOND: CULTURAL IMAGES
AND THE SHAPING OF US SOCIAL POLICY 7-8 (1993). Jewell states that it was not until
dire poverty became more visible among the classes during the late 19 th century with
industrialization that the idea of meritocracy came into power. “Those who were benefiting
immensely from an inequitable distribution of society’s resources, through the exploitation
of the labor and the poverty class, realized that it was imperative to develop explanations
for their wealth and the poverty of the masses…The privileged argued that their material
and monetary advantage was attributable to higher levels of intelligence, based on merit,
and to virtues that were absent among the lower classes and non-European people…” To
advance this premise, wealthy think tanks developed instruments such as standardized
tests, by design, to validate this assumption; see also D. Gersh, The Corporate Elite and
the Introduction of IQ Testing in American Public Schools, in THE STRUCTURE OF POWER
IN AMERICA, NEW YORK: HOLMES AND MEIER PUBLISHERS 163-64 (M. Schwartz ed.,
1987).
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The Psychological Comfort of Colorblindness
At first glance, colorblind theory blended multiculturalism and tolerance,
concepts introduced into late 1980s educational discourse to evolve school
curricula and recognize the achievements of historically unrepresented
groups, namely, immigrants and people of color.48 Upon critical analysis,
colorblind theory in this context was a retrogression in racial equality because
it denied the very existence of color and, therefore, dismissed the science,
data, and sociology of how race factored into all aspects of society. 49
In the 1990s, colorblindness was a politically expedient theory developed
to allow one to pretend not to see color. If we could suspend disbelief, then
we could all be done with this “entire messy, disheartening business of
redressing the legacies of racial exclusion and exploitation.” 50 If we could
pretend there was a level playing field and pretend to transcend color, we
could get back to business as usual. We wouldn’t have to open our eyes to
the fact that the “architects [of the American State] decided the concept of
property was more important—more real—than the possibilities of the
human being.”51 This American value of profit over human potential is
clearly demonstrated through the economic design of slave, indentured and
migrant labor and currently visible in the prison and immigrant detention

48

See Caitlin L. Ryan & Adrienne D. Dixson, Rethinking Pedagogy to Re-center Race:
Some Reflections, 84 LANGUAGE ARTS 175 (2006).
49
See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). The Court relied heavily
on social science data to show the psychological impact of segregation. Segregation and
color-blind theory both aspire to an ahistorical political reality where the fiction of equality
narrates. Both policies fail to examine the social construction of race itself, individual and
group racial identity development, and the harmful psychological effects that result when
people’s ancestral cultural identity is denied and silenced); see also Subini Ancy
Annamma, Conceptualizing Color-Evasiveness: Using Dis/Ability Critical Race Theory
To Expand A Colorblind Racial Ideology In Education And Society, 20 RACE ETHNICITY
& EDU. 147 (2017).
50
Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race To the Bottom: How the Post-Racial Revolution
Became A Whitewash, THE BAFFLER, Jun. 7, 2017, at 40.
51
JAMES BALDWIN, COLLECTED ESSAYS, PRICE OF THE TICKET 841 (4th ed. 1998).
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economy,52 the philanthropic sector,53 as well as in the halls of the United
Nations’ summits on the climate crisis. 54
Most importantly, colorblind theory allowed recipients of white privilege
and social capital to blindly maneuver through America’s racial hierarchy on
the fantasy of meritocracy. It saved those of us who identify as white the hard
labor and anguish of retracing European immigration into white
assimilation55 and recognizing the full breadth of white privilege and white
52

See Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Race, Prisons And War: Scenes from The History Of US
Violence, 45 SOCIALIST REG. 73-87 (2009) (“What can be said about a political culture in
search of ‘infinite prosperity’ that is dependent on a perpetual enemy who must always be
fought but can never be vanquished?”) Wilson Gilmore, an abolitionist scholar, addresses
how the public sector, such as state agencies (e.g., Departments of Correction), compete
for revenue and investment in the prison economy; see also YUKI NOGUCHI, Under Siege
And Largely Secret: Businesses That Serve Immigration Detention. NAT’L. PUB. RADIO,
https://www.npr.org/2019/06/30/736940431/under-siege-and-largely-secret-businessesthat-serve-immigration-detention, [https://perma.cc/PPK7-GCH7]; Two private prison
corporations, CoreCivic and GEO Group, run the majority of detention centers for
refugees, and one quarter of their profits are attributed to detention economy, with a
combined revenue of $4.1 billion in 2018. Their new contracts with the federal government
for detention centers have offset their declining profits in the prison industry. Southwest
Keys, another private detention corporation that houses the majority of refugee children in
the American Southwest, revenued $450 million; Juan Sanchez, its CEO, receives an
annual salary of $1.5 million; and he personally owns 33% of the SW Key property;
Shannon Najmabadi & Jay Root, Southwest Key CEO has Financial Stake in Property
Leased by Migrant Shelter Operator, TEX. TRIB., (Sept. 29, 2018),
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/09/29/sanchez-part-owner-property-leased-southwestkey-programs-eller-said-a/ [https://perma.cc/GH8Z-AXG7].
53
Villanueva demonstrates how wealth causes further harm even in the field of
philanthropy and guides managers of financial services and venture capitalists to transform
their relationship with money to heal and foster human potential. See Edgar Villanueva,
Decolonizing Wealth: Indigenous Wisdom to Heal Divides and Restore Balance (BerrettKoehler, 2018)
54
Greta Thunberg’s speech at the United Nations Climate Action Summit addressed this
very concept of profit over human potential and survival: “We are at the beginning of a
mass extinction, and all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic
growth. How dare you!” Greta Thunberg’s Speech At The U.N. Climate Action Summit,
NAT’L. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 23, 2019)
https://www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript-greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-un-climate-action-summit [https://perma.cc/LTB9-2DX5].
55
TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION 37 (Harv. U. Press 1992). Nobel Prize in Literature winner, Toni Morrison,
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dominance. For many European immigrants, “power - control of one’s own
destiny - would replace the powerless felt before the gates of class, caste, and
cunning persecution [in the Old World]. [In the New World], one could move
from discipline and punishment to disciplining and punishing.” 56 Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw in her critique of colorblind theory and the myth of the
post-racial world we inhabited after the election of President Obama, states,
“[c]olorblind theory not only undermines law and social policy that rely on
race-conscious analysis, but also soothes anxiety about the stubborn
endurance of the structures of white dominance.”57 In America’s racialized
society, the combination of colorblind theory and meritocracy licenses the
wealthy to view themselves as “productive geniuses.” 58 What is more
enticing to the judiciary, many of whom come from the womb of meritocracy,

has examined how the European imagination imprinted itself on the literary canon by
expressing its:
“understandably human fears: Americans’ fears of being outcast, of failing,
of powerlessness; their fear of boundarylessness, of Nature unbridled and
crouched for the attack; their fear of the absence of so-called civilization; their
fear of loneliness, of aggression both external and internal.”
“What passes for identity in America is a series of myths about one’s heroic
ancestors. It’s astounding to me, for example, that so many people really appear
to believe that the country was founded by a band of heroes who wanted to be
free. That happens not be true. What happened was that some people left
Europe because they couldn’t stay there any longer and had to go someplace
else to make it. That’s all. They were hungry, they were poor, they were
convicts. Those who were making it in England, for example, did not get on the
Mayflower.”
See supra note 50, at 684.
56
Id., Morrison, supra note 55, at 35.
57
Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 52.
58
Peter Baker & Maggie Habberman, Trump, Defending his Mental Fitness, Says He’s a
“Very Stable Genius”, N.Y. TIMES, (Jun. 6, 2018), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/us/politics/trump-genius-mental-health.html
[https://perma.cc/2MBR-F3KD].

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Shaw Claim

than an ideology that justifies positionality within the social hierarchy and
justifies the status quo?

III: THEORY MEETS REALITY, DATA OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION
“It’s almost like we are in a state of denial. We often point to
these very eloquently stated principles of equality but yet we have a
very difficult time applying them to contemporary times.”59
−Joaquin G. Avila
Colorblind theory has no factual basis. It is pure conjecture based on
narrative. Facts can arrive through narrative, but they also arrive as raw data.
The purest fact exists as a number, a data point. From data, we derive
predictions

through

pattern

recognition,

statistical

inference,

and

probabilistic modeling. Marketers market, candidates target campaigns,
maps are drawn, legislators draft legislation–from data.
Five years before Shaw, the Supreme Court in Gingles established a datadriven analysis to assess voting rights violation by effect or impact: the
totality of circumstances test. The totality of circumstances test examines a
list of socio-economic and political factors, known as the Senate Factors, to
determine the extent to which racial discrimination impacted the opportunity
for voters to participate in the electoral process equally. The factors include:
1) the history of official discrimination such as segregation; 2) effects of
discrimination in education, employment, health that hinder the ability to
participate; 3) racially polarized voting; 4) mechanisms that may enhance
opportunity for discrimination such as at-large election districts; 5) candidate
slating process where members can be denied access if they are not
nominated by a political group; 6) political campaigns characterized by
subtle or overt racial appeals; 7) the extent to which minority groups have
been elected to public office; 8) lack of responsiveness on the part of elected
59

Network X, The National Election and the Future of American Democracy, Guest Joaquin Avila, Visiting Assistant Prof. of Law MacArthur Fellow, YOUTUBE (Jan. 24,
2009), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hns6e-rQypI [https://perma.cc/UVU6-BZS9].
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officials to needs of minority community; and 9) the tenuousness of the
underlying policy and justification for voting measures (e.g., the policy of
cleaning up voter rolls or deterring voter fraud to justify targeting and
expunging registrations of minority voters).60 Data on the above factors
inform the Court as they consider, given the totality of circumstances,
whether voters’ political rights are infringed upon. The Senate Factors
recognize that inequity and inequality take many forms, that each case is factsensitive, and that various factors impact access to practice democratic and
political rights.
The totality of circumstances test established by Gingles overruled Mobile
and acknowledged the impossible burden of proof set by Mobile, which
required plaintiffs to have a smoking gun of racially discriminatory intent
based on raw data. Had Mobile not been overturned, it is hypothesized that
no Section 2 VRA cases would have been filed after 1982.61
NAACP v. McCrory is a perfect example of the burden of proving
discriminatory intent. In July 2016, in NAACP, the 4th Circuit found racial
data as the linchpin to yet another North Carolina voting rights discrimination
case. Immediately upon the gutting of the federal Voting Rights Act in Shelby
County, North Carolina’s General Assembly enacted HB 589, a state law
limiting early voting, requiring voter identification, reducing polling sites,
and eliminating sites on college campuses, in minority neighborhoods and
near churches.62 The 4th circuit ruled the law was enacted with racially
60

Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 36-37.
Had Mobile not been overturned, the unbearable standard of discriminatory intent
would have decreased all voting rights actions between 1982-2006 by 62%. Legislative
Proposals to Strengthen the Voting Rights Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019) (statement of Witness, J.M. Kousser, California Institute of
Technology).
62
N.C. State Conf. of the NAACP v McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (2016). (“On the day
after the Supreme Court issued Shelby County v. Holder, eliminating preclearance
obligations, a leader of the party that newly dominated the legislature (and the party that
rarely enjoyed African American support) announced an intention to enact what he
characterized as an “omnibus” election law. Before enacting that law, the legislature
requested data on the use, by race, of a number of voting practices. Upon receipt of the
61
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discriminatory intent to suppress black voters because state legislators had
requested racial data on every voting provision that produced higher turnouts for black voters and then drafted legislation to eliminate those very
provisions. The 4th Circuit stated the discrimination was done with “surgical
precision.”63 The opinion states, “Indeed, neither this legislature—nor, as far
as we can tell, any other legislature in the Country—has ever done so much,
so fast, to restrict access to the franchise.”64 But a smoking gun of racially
discriminatory intent is rarely if ever available, which is why the Voting
Rights Act allows for complaints based on discriminatory impact and effects
and uses the data-driven totality of circumstances test.
However, the district court and the Supreme Court in Shaw did not
interrogate facts, data, or factor in historical discrimination and its effect on
the electorate. Morgan Kousser, nationally renowned historian and voting
rights expert witness, declared,
The three-judge panel of the Eastern District of North Carolina
held no hearing on the facts of North Carolina politics or
redistricting, the Shaw appellants were free to construct a fictitious,
false, ‘colorblind’ picture of the state’s past and present, and to
make utterly unevidenced assertions about social psychology, and
the Supreme Court had no concrete reason to doubt any of it.65
The appellants’ brief went so far to state,
No court or agency has determined that racial discrimination has
ever occurred in the creation of congressional districts in North
Carolina. Indeed, it is clear that none has taken place; and so, there

race data, the General Assembly enacted legislation that restricted voting and registration
in five different ways, all of which disproportionately affected African Americans.”)
63
Id.
64
Id. at 228; see also Vann R. Newkirk II, The Battle for North Carolina: Political, Social,
and Demographic Forces in the Battleground of North Carolina Promise a Reckoning with
its
Jim
Crow
Past,
THE
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
27,
2016),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/the-battle-for-northcarolina/501257/ [https://perma.cc/GR37-93BD].
65
Kousser, supra note 10, at 7.
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was no constitutional violation to be remedied by establishing two
majority-minority districts.66
These statements were obviously false given the fact that North Carolina
had a well-documented and sordid past of racially discriminatory voting
measures intended to impact, dilute and disenfranchise the black electorate.
For these reasons, 40 counties in North Carolina had been under federal
preclearance by the Department of Justice since 1965. However, instead of
conducting a factual investigation required of typical voting rights or equal
protection claims, the Court rested on a colorblind narrative.
Once again, white voters in Shaw were not claiming that they had been
racially discriminated against or that their vote had been diluted or infringed
upon. White voters put forward an entirely unrecognized claim of action by
alleging that North Carolina’s General Assembly had injured a public value,
the value of an electoral and judicial system that should be blind to color. If
race-conscious districting occurred and voters were placed within or without
a district based on their race, even for remedial purposes, and the district lines
appeared “bizarre,” then race was deemed the predominant factor.67
Strict Scrutiny: The Invention Of “Traditional Redistricting
Principles” and Redefining Narrowly Tailored
Although the Supreme Court had not yet developed a clear line of case law
regarding whether intermediate or strict scrutiny applied within this
context,68 the Court applied strict scrutiny, subjecting compliance to the
Voting Rights Act to heightened scrutiny for the first time. Strict scrutiny
required North Carolina to prove it had a compelling state interest to use race

66

Id. at 8.
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 650-651. The term “race as a predominant factor” was established in
Miller v Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). Miller recognized and applied the colorblind Equal
Protection principles of Shaw.
68
See Metro Broad., Inc. v. Federal Commc’n Comm’n 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 448 U.S. 469 (1989); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
67
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in drawing the Twelfth District to comply with the Voting Rights Act and
prove that how it used race was narrowly tailored.
If race was found to be the predominant factor in drawing district lines,
then strict scrutiny applied. Race, the Court concluded, could be one factor
in redistricting but could not be the predominant factor, meaning race could
not be used above “traditional redistricting principles,” a newly invented term
by the Shaw majority to justify colorblind principles.69 To clarify, the Shaw
majority invented this term to create a criterion to weigh race-consciousness.
This criterion placed race-consciousness on a scale to determine what amount
of race-consciousness would tip the scales into strict scrutiny. According to
Justice O’Conner, traditional redistricting principles included “compactness,
contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.”70 Justice O’Conner further
opined that the newly invented criterion, “traditional redistricting principles”,
was not, however, required by the Constitution.71 Conveniently, this saved
white-majority districts from a compactness standard.
The Shaw plurality then came up with its own test for “narrowly-tailored.”
They decided a measure of geographical compactness would determine
whether or not the law was narrowly tailored. The irregular shape of the
Twelfth District was not compact enough to the naked eye and, therefore, not

69

J. Morgan Kousser, Injustice and Scholarship, 24 SOC. SCI. HIST. 415, (2000), at 415421. (“Throughout the series of cases, the Shaw justices have invented what they have
termed ‘traditional districting principles’ at will, in a wholly unsystematic fashion, with no
factual or logical justifications, in transparent efforts to justify outcomes that they prefer
for other reasons. In the same decisions, they have twisted words - for instance, terming
the most integrated congressional districts in the history of North Carolina ‘segregated’
and reminiscent of ‘apartheid’ -and they have distorted history, confusing acts intended to
harm minorities with electoral structures designed to give minorities in racially polarized
polities only an equal, not a disproportionate, chance to elect candidates of their choice.
From decision to decision, the Shaw Five have adopted a set of ad hoc principles that have
almost always carefully protected the interests of the Republican party to which they
belong and have undermined the Democratic party to which African Americans and
Latinos overwhelmingly adhere.”)
70
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 647.
71
Id. at 677 (J. Stevens dissent).
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narrowly-tailored.72 However, Justice O’Connor did find that an alternative
map was reasonably compact: a Republican-dominated area that was “thirty
miles longer and much more difficult to traverse” than the majority-minority
Twelfth District.73 Compactness was in the eye of the beholder. Different
standards applied to majority-white districts and majority-minority districts.
Furthering a Compelling Government Interest
North Carolina had sufficient evidence to prove a compelling state interest
as it was under federal preclearance and the Department of Justice had
rejected its first map which created only one majority-minority district. To
comply with the Voting Rights Act and pass federal preclearance, North
Carolina created two majority-minority districts. Furthermore, an extensive
history of racial discrimination, data of Senator factors and pervasive racial
bloc voting was available, but the court dismissed all these findings.74
In 1990, the inequality between different racial groups in the United States
had received considerable attention on the global scale by the winner of the

72

KOUSSER, supra note 10, at 387. J. Morgan Kousser compares two different maps from
congressional districts in Texas to show the arbitrary discretion used in determining
compactness. Side-by-side both maps appear similar and bizarre in shape yet one is held
compact and the other is not. The 91% white, 72% Republican map was found
constitutional and the 50% black, 75% Democratic map found unconstitutional.
73
KOUSSER, supra note 10, at 385.
74
Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657; Miller, 515 U.S. at 900 builds on Shaw’s dismissal of data that
could have demonstrated a compelling state interest. Although the jurisdiction in Miller
was under federal preclearance which proved in and of itself a history of racially
discriminatory voting practices, the Shaw majority justices stated, with unabashed circular
logic, that proof of racial discrimination was insufficient to prove a compelling state
interest for majority-minority districts. Compliance with the Voting Rights Act did not
prove a compelling state interest. Miller justified its disregard of facts by stating, in effect,
race-conscious remedies were not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading:
(“Whether or not in some cases compliance with the [Voting Rights] Act, standing alone,
can provide a compelling interest independent of any interest in remedying past
discrimination, it cannot do so here. As we suggested in Shaw, compliance with federal
anti-discrimination laws cannot justify race-based districting where the challenged district
was not reasonably necessary under a constitutional reading and application of those
laws.”); See 509 U.S., at 663-655; Miller, 515 U.S. at 921.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Shaw Claim

Nobel Prize of Economics, Amartya Sen.75 Regarding health disparity, Sen
put forth evidence showing that the premature mortality rates of black men
in the United States were higher than men living in poverty in China, Sri
Lanka, Costa Rica and the Indian state of Kerala. Black women’s premature
mortality rates in the United States were also higher than women living in
poverty in China and Kerala. Premature mortality alone could not be
attributed to factors of violence or poverty.
A medical study revealed that, even when adjusted for variable incomes,
black women die younger in very large proportions compared to white
women in the United States. Black women in the United States had nearly
three times the mortality rate of white women, and black men had nearly two
times the mortality rate of white men.76 Regarding environment justice, in
1991, “a report from the Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that a
disproportionate number of toxic waste facilities were found in African
American communities nationwide.”77 Regarding education and employment
inequity, prior to the 1990 census, black women accounted for 52% of all
private household cleaners and one-quarter of those employed as maids.78
Regarding a history of official segregation, racially explicit government
policies segregated American metropolitan areas and were powerful enough
to create de jure segregation. 79 Regarding economic injustice, in 1990, an
undercover test reported the average profit on an $11,000 car deal. Adjusted
for inflation to 2019, this study revealed the average profit for a $21,609 car
75

See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom, (Anchor Books, 1999) 96-98.
Id.
77
See Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government
Segregated America (Liveright Publishing Corp. 2017) at 56.
78
Jewell, supra note 47, at 44.
79
Rothstein argues that the effects of government sponsored segregation exist today in
neighborhoods and schools and therefore, we have a constitutional obligation to remedy
them. De jure segregation refers to government sponsored segregation: the intent of
policies set forth by the Public Works Administration and the Federal Housing
Administration to segregate based on race. Rothstein’s research debunks the myth of de
factor segregation, that racially segregated neighborhoods are the result of private
prejudice and income differences. Rothstein, supra note 77, at 56.
76
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deal: $711 profit on a white male; $990 on a white female; $1,538 profit on
a black male; and a $2,430 profit on a black female.80 Regarding criminal
justice disparity, “In 1991, the Sentencing Project reported that the number
of people behind bars in the United States was unprecedented in world
history, and that one fourth of young African American men were now under
the control of the criminal justice system.” 81
Criminal justice disparity, economic injustice, official discrimination and
segregation, education and employment inequality, environment justice and
health disparities clearly demonstrated the first two Senator Factors and
corroborated evidence of voting rights violations. These disparities existed
under America’s national leadership, comprised almost exclusively of white,
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant males for the first two-thirds of the 20th century,
leading up to Shaw.82 North Carolina was not immune to the nation’s malady
of racial inequity.
The Value of Political Integration
It was not a matter of data that North Carolina lacked to prove a history of
discrimination to defend its compliance with the Voting Rights Act and its
predominant use of race in District Twelve. It was a matter of judicial
comprehension and consciousness: the political and racial lens through which
the Supreme Court manufactured its decision. The habitus83 used to justify

80

Jewell, supra note 47, at 93.
See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of
Colorblindness (The New Press 2012) at 56.
82
See Sen, supra note 75, at 56.
83
Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility, 3(3) INT. J. OF CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 54, 58 (2011).
Robin DiAngelo articulates the disequilibrium of white identity in American white
supremacist culture by referencing the concept of habitus first put forth by French social
theorist, Pierre Bourdieu, framing the cultural conditioning of Whiteness. DiAngelo
defines habitus as: (“socialized subjectivity; a set of dispositions which generate practices
and perceptions. As such, habitus only exists in, through and because of the practices of
actors and their interaction with each other and with the rest of their environment. Based
on the previous conditions and experiences that produce it, habitus produces and
reproduces thoughts, perceptions, expressions and actions.”)
81
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Shaw, and its enduring judicial legitimacy provokes two underlying
questions: 1) What was the Court’s theory on political integration; and 2)
What was the Court’s theory on how political freedoms were actually to be
exercised, put into practice, and accessible in a functioning democracy. The
importance of political access - the ability to practice democratic and political
rights– requires a private right of action to manifest political integration. This
private right of action is the federal Voting Rights Act as authorized under
Section II of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Sen asserts,
The extraordinary deprivations in health care, education, and the
social environment of African Americans in the United States help
to make their mortality rates exceptionally high, and this is not
prevented by the working of American democracy. Democracy has
to be seen as creating a set of opportunities, and the use of these
opportunities calls for analysis of a different kind, dealing with the
practice of democratic and political rights. In this respect, the low
percentage of voting in American elections. . .. and other signs of
alienation cannot be ignored. Democracy does not serve as an
automatic remedy of ailments as quinine works to remedy malaria.
The opportunity it opens up has to be positively grabbed. . .. 84
One of America’s most prominent voting rights leaders and litigators,
Joaquin G. Avila, similarly affirmed, “[p]olitical power is never given away,
you have to take it.”85 From a self-preservation perspective, Avila spoke
often on the importance of political integration of historically oppressed
communities:
[i]f you don’t have [people] politically integrated, they are not
part of the body politic, they don’t have a sense of ownership, they
don’t have a vested interest into the future… Just from a purely
84

Sen, supra note 75, at 155.
Obituary, Sam Roberts, Joaquin Avila, Advocate of Hispanic Voting Rights, Dies at
69, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 15, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/obituaries/joaquin-avila-advocate-of-hispanicvoting-rights-dies-at-69.html [https://perma.cc/F2FC-GFPS].
85
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societal self-preservation instinct, the majority, middle-class white
America, should see it is in their vested interest to make sure that
the political process is completely accessible and completely
transparent.86
Colorblind

jurisprudence

has

deteriorated

political

accessibility,

transparency and accountability. Additionally, it has manifested rife partisan
and racial polarization. Contrary to legal precedent that justified raceconscious remedies in voting rights violations, Justice O’Connor (joined by
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas) held in Shaw, “[r]acial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into
competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a
political system in which race no longer matters- a goal that the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments embody, to which the Nation continues to
aspire.” Its critical to note the term racial gerrymandering referred to the
drawing of race-conscious districts. Justice O’Connor’s misappropriation of
this term has endured. She further opined that racial gerrymandering would
reinforce stereotypes that members of the same race voted alike, and
therefore, these stereotypes would lead elected officials to respond only to
their own racial group rather than the entire district. Justice O’Connor’s
analysis did not fail to appreciate that color did not always determine how
one individual voted, however, her analysis did fail to acknowledge the
history of American elections up until present-day: that collective racial
identity matters and that it has always defined partisan lines. 87
86

Network X, The National Election and the Future of American Democracy, Guest Joaquin Avila, Visiting Assistant Prof. of Law MacArthur Fellow, (Nov. 4, 2004),
YOUTUBE (January 24, 2009) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hns6e-rQypI
[https://perma.cc/KV87-RVGX].
87
See Rory McVeigh, David Cunningham & Justin Farrell, Political Polarization as a
Social Movement Outcome: 1960s Klan Activism and Its Enduring Impact on Political
Realignment in Southern Counties, 1960 to 2000, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1144, 1144-1171
(2014). (McVeigh, Cunningham and Farrell examine how politics have become more
polarized in the United States since the Civil Rights Movement although people in general
have not. Prior to the 1960s, the South predominately identified as Democratic. The Klu
Klux Klan mobilized white voters in the south to shift their allegiance from Democratic to
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Since historical and present harms impact racial groups, the remedies must
be afforded accordingly. Remedying barriers to equality in political rights is
not about an individual voter but about voters as a group and whether
communities of color have equal access to the ballot. Data reveal that race
and color highly correlate with how one votes. Redistricting has always been
and continues to be racialized.
Year and

Percentage of

Percentage of

Percentage of

Democratic

Black Voters

Latinx Voters

White Voters

Presidential
Candidate88
1996

Bill

84%

73%

44%

2000 Al Gore

90%

62%

42%

2004 John Kerry

88%

53%

41%

2008 Barack

95%

67%

43%

93%

71%

39%

89%

66%

37%

Clinton

Obama
2012 Barack
Obama
2016 Hillary
Clinton
For the majority of the twentieth century and all of the twenty-first century,
African American and Latinx communities have overwhelmingly voted for
Democratic candidates.

Although this sample does not reflect the

Republican, encouraging white voters to prioritize the defense of white supremacy when
making voting decisions. Polarization in local contexts resulting from Klan activism in
the 60s helped ensure that voting realignment would be long-lasting).
88
How Groups Voted, ROPER CENTER, https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/datahighlights/elections-and-presidents/how-groups-voted [https://perma.cc/RZM9-LG9H].
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complexities of individual racial identities and alternative political
preferences, it does show how race aligns with partisanship.
Colorblind narratives are illusions. Jurisprudence is not created in a blind
vacuum, devoid of culture, politics, partisanship, economics, and one’s
personal identity and experiences. An independent judiciary is not only
charged with interrogating data and discerning the causes and conditions that
produce the data, but with questioning deracialized narratives.

IV: PLESSY’S DESCENDANTS: SHAW, BLUM AND SHELBY
Racism isn’t a product of race.
Race is a product of racism.
−Dorothy Roberts89
Judges with lifetime appointments base their decisions on narratives, on
the art of storytelling, and on conjecture and fantasy. The fantasy of
transcendence and aspiration of a society that sees no color is apathetic and
intellectually indolent. It is dishonorable because it negates the hard-fought
progress of American civil and human rights.
In Shelby County, the court had 15,000 pages of evidence of persistent and
pervasive racial discrimination in the covered jurisdictions, but in a five-four
decision, the court determined that preclearance was unnecessary. 90 This
hazardous decision was not based on data; rather the decision was based on

89

Leviton, supra note 7, at 4.
See Legislative Proposals to Strengthen the Voting Rights Act, Hearing Before the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Congress (Oct. 17, 2019) (statement of Witness, J.M.
Kousser, CA Institute of Technology); See also Morgan Kousser, Do the Facts of Voting
Rights Support Chief Justices Opinion in Shelby County?, TRANSATLANTICA, 2015, at 1,
37. Kousser bases his opinion on research from the “largest database of voting rights
‘events’—successful lawsuits, Section 5 Justice Department objections and ‘more
information requests,’ and consent decrees or settlements out of court that led to prominority changes—ever compiled”—to provide an “overview of the history of U.S. voting
rights from 1957, when the first U.S. civil rights law in 82 years passed, through 2013”)
[https://perma.cc/8GTC-N3DE]. For synthesis, see Voting Rights, by the Numbers, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 19,, 2015, at 10.
90

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Shaw Claim

the principle of colorblindness in a fantastical post-racial democracy.91 The
narrative of a post-racial federalist democracy persuaded five justices to
“throw out the umbrella in a rainstorm because [they] were not getting wet.”92
Shaw not only set the stage for the gutting of the federal Voting Rights Act
in Shelby County v. Holder,93 but it reverberates today in the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In June 2018, the Ninth Circuit ruled in Higginson v
Becerra that a white voter had Article III standing to allege an injury based
on a change of election method from at-large to by-district.94 The Ninth
Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, conferred federal standing to a white voter
to pursue a Shaw Equal Protection claim,95 although the voter, similar to
Shaw plaintiffs, neglected to state his race or the racial make-up of his
district.96 Yet, he alleged that due to his race, he suffered an injury as a result
of a by-district election method.97
By-district election methods are common remedies for vote dilution when
racially polarized voting (RPV) interacts with racial bloc voting.98 By-district
election methods protect a racial minority community’s ability to equally

91

Crenshaw, supra note 50, at 40.
Shelby Co., 570 U.S. at 561 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting).
93
In Shelby Co. the Supreme Court gutted the federal Voting Rights Act by invalidating
Section 4(b), what is commonly known as federal preclearance. Federal preclearance under
the VRA was the most effective civil rights mechanism to counter voter discrimination due
to the fact that case-by-case litigation was ineffective. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
in an 8 to 1 decision, the Court upheld federal preclearance and the mechanism that placed
the burden of proof on the jurisdiction, not the victims, stating, (“Congress had found that
case-by-case litigation was inadequate to combat widespread and persistent discrimination
in voting, because of the inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the
obstructionist tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a
century of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well decide
to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”)
Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966).
94
Higginson v. Becerra, No. 17CV2032-WQH-JLB, 2018 WL 4759204 (S.D. Cal. Oct.
2, 2018).
95
Higginson v. Becerra, 733 Fed. Appx. 402, 403 (9th Cir. 2018).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
92
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participate in the electoral process and elect a candidate of its choice.99
Simply put, in Higginson v Becerra, one Ninth Circuit three-judge panel
allowed a voter to sue a state and local jurisdiction for enforcing civil rights
legislation, legislation authorized under state and federal law. 100
The most disingenuous distortion of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
the campaign of Edward Blum. Blum, a wealthy financial advisor, with no
legal background, has funded dozens of lawsuits to use colorblind theory to
undermine the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 101 Blum funded
Higginson v Becerra and heads the Project on Fair Representation, which is
a “public interest organization dedicated to the promotion of equal
opportunity and racial harmony. working to advance race-neutral
principles.”102 Blum’s most infamous win was Shelby County v Holder. Since

99

Racially polarized voting (RPV) is when voters vote within racial coalitions. Blocvoting is when a racial majority voting coalition defeats the preferred candidate of a
cohesive minority racial voting coalition. RPV analysis is: (“a social science methodology
that allows practitioners to assess whether or not elections for city council (or another
office) can be characterized by opposing voting coalitions – hence polarized…Using
demographic data about the race or ethnicity of the voters within a precinct, the social
scientist can determine whether or not a certain candidate for political office was preferred
by the racial group that is a numeric minority in the city. Beyond this, [RPV analysis] can
reveal whether or not the same candidate was preferred or blocked by voters who make up
the numeric majority in the city…Polarized voting is determined by examining the results
of past elections in which at least one candidate of the protected class ran and assessing
whether the protected class voted cohesively to try and elect their preferred candidate, but
the rest of the population came together to bloc-vote against the protected class’ preferred
candidate.”)
Amicus Curiae Br. of The UCLA Voting Rights Project In Support Of Appellees at 11-13,
Higginson v Becerra, No. 19-55275 (9th Cir., 2019) (No. 58) (filed August 22, 2019).
100
Higginson v. Becerra, 786 Fed. Appx. 705, 707 (9th Cir. 2019) Higginson was
dismissed for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) by the 9th Circuit on December 4, 2019.
The case was also dismissed twice by the Southern District Court of California for failure
to state a claim.
101
Anemona Hartocollis, He Took on the Voting Rights Act and Won. Now He’s Taking
on Harvard, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.19, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/19/us/affirmative-action-lawsuits.html
[https://perma.cc/VW3B-HJD2] Blum groomed Higginson in colorblind theory.
102
See Amicus Curiae Br. of Project for Fair Representation, Dep’t of Com. v. N.Y., 315
F. Supp. 3d 766 (2019) (No. 18-966) (filed Feb. 12, 2019) available at
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Shelby, the flood gates have opened for notorious voter suppression in the
formerly covered states, which one could argue contributed to the 2016
Presidential outcome.103 The campaign of Donald Trump had the most welldocumented Senate Factors: racially polarized voting and a political
campaign characterized by overt racial appeals.104
Blum’s rhetoric of promoting racial harmony while simultaneously gutting
the most important civil rights legislation authorized by the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments is akin to the narrative of “separate but equal” by the
Supreme Court in Plessy, legalizing racial apartheid as a valid exercise of
“the state’s power to promote health, safety, and morals.”105 Looking beneath
the veneer of narratives, the strategy of using language such as “racial
harmony” and “race-neutral policies” to deepen the chasm of racial disparity
in positions of social, economic, and political power is not only ironic but
deceitful. During the end of the Nineteenth century, with the sharp rise of
lynching and other forms of white supremacist domestic terrorism,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-966/91010/20190306184903400_18966_Amicus_Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5AH-7A24].
103
See Morris supra note 12; See Crenshaw, supra note 57, at 50.
104
The Trump Administration rhetoric has emboldened a rise in white nationalism, hate
crimes and violence, not only within our borders but abroad. A coalition of organizations
is tracking the rise in hate crimes since the 2016 election. Editorial Board, Opinion, Why
We Need A Project to Document Hate Crimes, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/opinion/why-we-need-a-project-to-document-hatecrimes.html [https://perma.cc/DS77-F283]; See supra note 12; See David A. Graham,
Adrienne Green, Cullen Murphy, & Parker Richards, An Oral History of Trump’s
Bigotry, THE ATLANTIC (June 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/06/trump-racism-comments/588067/
[https://perma.cc/SRH3-Y5RU]; See Peter Baker and Michael D. Shear, El Paso
Shooting Suspect’s Manifesto Echoes Trump’s Language, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/04/us/politics/trump-mass-shootings.html
[https://perma.cc/5KCN-YBT2]. Senator Kamala Harris has requested that Twitter
suspend Trump’s account because of its white nationalist rhetoric, See Chandelis Duster,
Kamala Harris Defends Her Push to Get Trump’s Twitter Account Suspended, CNN
(October 16, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/16/politics/kamala-harris-trump-twittersuspension-cnntv/index.html [https://perma.cc/RE9B-PC5G].
105
MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY, 21, 24 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2004).

VOLUME 18 • ISSUE 1 • 2020

57

58

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

segregation was justified as an “embodiment of enlightened public policy,”
just as colorblind theory was applauded and justified at the end of the
Twentieth century in Shaw. Shaw is a direct descendant of Plessy.
As J. Skelly Wright, former Chief Justice of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, referring to Plessy, opined, “It
is a tribute to the American ideal of equality that the High Court was driven
to lie rather than to admit what it was doing.”106 Similarly, when the Supreme
Court ruled in Shaw v. Reno that a white voter had standing to allege a
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim, based on a generalized
grievance of a majority-minority district electing the first black
representative in nearly 100 years, the court was driven to lie rather than
admit what it was doing. The court was designing a mechanism for white
citizens to appropriate and co-op laws that were specifically written to
provide remedies to voters of color who were, and currently are, denied an
equal opportunity to participate in the democratic process and, therefore,
disparately underrepresented in local, state, and federal government.107
106

J. Skelly Wright, Color-Blind Theories and Color-Conscious Remedies, 47 U. CHI L.
REV. 213, (1980). Judge Wright was appointed by President John F. Kennedy and laid the
foundation for affirmative action.
107
The Voting Rights Act was a culmination of a century of civil rights laws intended to
protect the constitutional rights of people of color within the borders of the United States.
The Civil Rights Enforcement Acts of 1866, 1870 (also known as the First Klu Klux Klan
Act) and 1871 (also known as the Second Klu Klux Klan Act) pioneered efforts to enforce
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The Acts were originally passed specifically to
protect African Americans’ human rights after the Civil War. White judges refused to
enforce the laws. Section 1983, which originated as Section 1 in the Second Klu Klux Klan
Act allowed people to sue in federal court when a state or local official violated their
federal rights: e.g., acts of terrorism by local officials against African Americans who
attempted to participate in the political process. Section 1983 and The Voting Rights Act
originated from congressional effort to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (2009). See The Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat.
27-30 (1866), Civil Rights Act of 1870, H.R. 1293, 41st Cong. § 1, §6, §7, (1870) (also
known as the First Klu Klux Klan Act of 1870)., Civil Rights Act of 1871, H.R. 2634 (also
known as the Second Klu Klux Klan Act), Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, §
131(b), 71 Stat. 337 (1957), Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Constitutional
Amendments and Major Civil Rights Acts of Congress Referenced in Black Americans in
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Similar to how Plessy paved the way for Shaw, Shaw paved the way for
Shelby County.
Narratives used to evade responsibility and aspire to colorblindness were
commonly used during the Plessy Era, denying and disguising the terrors of
racial violence. In 1921, in the peak of widespread lynching, the Mississippi
Supreme Court opined that “the humblest human being, be he white or black,
red or yellow, is entitled to a fair and impartial trial on the dole issues of guilt
and innocence.”108 In reality, this was the same time blacks could not serve
on juries, black lawyers would not be heard in court, the credibility of black
witnesses was always questioned, and the death penalty was used for black
men convicted of victimizing white women.109 This was a time when mobs
frequently surrounded courthouses, and retaliation was encouraged against
public supporters of black defendants, a time when defense lawyers for black
defendants were not appointed until the very morning of a trial. 110 Today, we
walk the same walk and talk the same talk. Without Socratic and independent
discernment in America’s racialized administration of justice, judges can
easily fall prey to aspirations of colorblind theory and “racial harmony” that
are divorced from reality.

SECTION V: TOWARD A JUDICIAL EVOLUTION
Expensively kept, economically unsound,
a spurious and useless political asset in election campaigns,
racism is as healthy today
as it was during the Enlightenment.
–Toni Morrison111

Congress, H.R. HISTORY, ART, & ARCHIVES, http://history.house.gov/Exhibitions-andPublications/BAIC/Historical-Data/Constitutional-Amendments-and-Legislation/
[https://perma.cc/54TA-S65P].
108
KLARMAN, supra note 105, at 130-31.
109
KLARMAN, supra note 105, at 130-31.
110
Id.
111
Morrison, supra note 55, at 63.
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During Shaw’s era, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, White, and
Souter laid the groundwork for racially-conscious remedies that today may
instruct federal courts.
Bakke’s Dissent
In University of California Regents v. Bakke112, five years before Shaw,
the Supreme Court banned the University of California Regent’s affirmative
action quota. At the time of Bakke, African Americans represented “1.2% of
the lawyers and judges, 2% of the physicians, 2.3% of the dentists, 1.1% of
the engineers, and 2.6% of the college and university professors.” 113
Although Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, stated,
[i]n order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.
There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally,
we must treat them differently. We cannot—we dare not—let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.114
Dethroning the supremacy of colorblindness, he elaborated, “[t]he sooner
we get down the road toward accepting and being a part of the real world,
and not shutting it out and away from us, the sooner will these difficulties
vanish from the scene.”115 His dissent accurately critiqued the illusion of a
colorblind society and signaled a warning call.
Justice Marshall’s dissent educated the court with a history lesson on the
origin of the Fourteenth Amendment and current data on the education,
health, and social mobility of African Americans.116 He pointed to the racial
disparity in infant mortality – twice that of white infants, in maternal
mortality – three times that of whites, in poverty – four times greater than

112

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265. Note that Justices Marshall, Brennan, White and Blackmun
concurred in judgment but wrote separate opinions of dissent.
113
Id. at 396 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
114
Id.
115
Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
116
Id. at 396 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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whites in general.117 His call to the court was clear: to affirm race-conscious
remedies. Justices Marshall and Blackmun analyzed data of racial
discrimination and concluded the federal court had a responsibility to uphold
racially-conscious remedies.118
The majority opinion of Bakke, similar to that of Shaw, did not account for
massive racial disparity and inequality nor the Court’s constitutional
imperative to remedy racial injustice under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
majority went so far as to state that the very “concepts of ‘majority’ and
‘minority’ necessarily reflect temporary arrangements and political
judgments,” effectively disregarding over 200 years of data on America’s
fixed and static white economic, cultural and political hegemony.119 The
opinion further extended the idea that as demographics shift, white AngloSaxon Protestants would become the minority, inferring reverse racism. 120
The court had yet to learn the definition of racism itself: that racism does not
work in reverse in a society where institutional power is white.121 Personal
117

Id. at 395, 396 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
Id. at 396 (Marshall, J. dissenting); Id. at 407 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
119
Id. at 326-327 (Brennan J., White J., Marshall J., & Blackmun J. concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in
the Constitution of our abiding belief in human equality, has been the law of our land for
only slightly more than half its 200 years. And for half of that half, the Equal Protection
Clause of the Amendment was largely moribund so that, as late as 1927, Mr. Justice
Holmes could sum up the importance of that Clause by remarking that it was the “last
resort of constitutional arguments.” Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 208 (1927). Worse than
desuetude, the [Equal Protection] Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] was early turned
against those whom it was intended to set free, condemning them to a “separate but
equal” status before the law, a status always separate but seldom equal. Not until 1954—
only 24 years ago—was this odious doctrine interred by our decision in Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (Brown I), and its progeny, which proclaimed that separate
schools and public facilities of all sorts were inherently unequal and forbidden under our
Constitution.”); see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (Oxford Univ. Press,
2004); see also Richard Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our
Government Segregated America (Liveright Publishing Corp. 2017).
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Id. at 395, 396 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
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bias based on color can exist from black to white, but the social construct of
race and racism exists and is systemically upheld by institutional
structures.122
Shaw’s Dissent
In Shaw, Justice Blackmun’s dissent reiterated his theme from Bakke, the
importance of integrating the real world. He cautioned,
[i]t is particularly ironic that the case in which today’s majority
chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time
this ‘analytically distinct’ constitutional claim is a challenge by
white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black
representatives to Congress for the first time since
Reconstruction.123

whites and another day (or even era) benefiting people of color. The direction of power
between whites and people of color is historic, traditional, normalized, and deeply
embedded in the fabric of U.S. society”). DiAngelo cites the work of Toni Morrison, Dr.
John Richard Feagin, Charles W. Mills, Patricia McIntosh, Ruth Frankenberg, Beverly
Tatum, and other Whiteness scholars. See John Richard Feagin, Systematic Racism: A
Theory Of Oppression (Routledge, 2006); Charles W. Mills, The Racial Contract (Cornell
University Press, 1999); Ruth Frankenberg, Introduction: Local Whitenesses, localizing
Whiteness, In Ruth Frankenberg (Ed.), Displacing Whiteness: Essays in social and cultural
criticism (Duke University Press, 1997) at 1-33; Beverly Tatum, “Why are All the Black
Kids Sitting Together in the Cafeteria?”: And Other Conversations about Race (Basic
Books, 1997); Morrison, supra note 53 ; Peggy McIntosh, White privilege and male
privilege: A personal account of coming to see correspondence through work in women’s
studies. In M. Anderson, & P. Hill Collins (Eds.), Race, class, and gender: An anthology
(Wadsworth, 1998) at 94-105.
122
Id. Examples of institutional structures and internalized white superiority in mainstream
culture: (“our [white people’s] centrality in history textbooks, historical representations
and perspectives; our centrality in media and advertising (for example, a recent Vogue
magazine cover boldly stated, “The World’s Next Top Models” and every woman on the
front cover was white); our teachers, role-models, heroes and heroines; everyday discourse
on “good” neighborhoods and schools and who is in them; popular TV shows centered
around friendship circles that are all white; religious iconography that depicts god, Adam
and Eve, and other key figures as white, commentary on new stories about how shocking
any crime is that occurs in white suburbs; and, the lack of a sense of loss about the absence
of people of color in most white people’s lives.”).
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Shaw, 509 U.S. 630, at 676 (Blackmun, J. dissenting).
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Justice Souter’s dissent focused on the lack of a cognizable legal theory,
challenged the use of strict scrutiny in redistricting cases, and emphasized the
lack of injury. “Under our cases there is, in general, a requirement that in
order to obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment, the purpose and
effect of the districting must be to devalue the effectiveness of a voter
compared to what, as a group member, he would otherwise be able to
enjoy.”124 Justice White emphasized how the Voting Rights Act and the
Fifteenth Amendment clearly authorized race-conscious remedies in
redistricting to ameliorate vote dilution and that the State had met its
burden.125 Similar to Justice Souter, Justice White questioned strict scrutiny
as the appropriate level of scrutiny and stated the Court had no constitutional
basis for requiring geographical compactness as part of its strict scrutiny
analysis.126 He asked, “[i]s it more ‘narrowly tailored’ to create an irregular
majority-minority district as opposed to one that is compact but harms other
state interests such as incumbency protection or the representation of rural
interests?”127 Justice Stevens also questioned the requirement of compactness
and found the Twelfth District’s shape irrelevant because of its known
purpose, stating,
[t]here is no independent constitutional requirement of
compactness or contiguity, and the Court’s opinion does not suggest
otherwise. The existence of bizarre and uncouth district boundaries
is powerful evidence of an ulterior purpose behind the shaping of
those boundaries—usually a purpose to advantage the political party
in control of the districting process. Such evidence will always be
useful in cases that lack other evidence of invidious intent. In this
case, however, we know what the legislators’ purpose was: The
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North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of
African-American voters.128
Justice Stevens further denounced the majority’s rationale as “perverse”
stating,
[i]f it is permissible to draw boundaries to provide adequate
representation for rural voters, for union members, for Hasidic Jews,
for Polish Americans, or for Republicans, it necessarily follows that
it is permissible to do the same thing for members of the very
minority group whose history in the United States gave birth to the
Equal Protection Clause…A contrary conclusion could only be
described as perverse.129
The dissents in both Bakke and Shaw caution that colorblind principles will
create injustice.
Former Supreme Court Justice, Benjamin Cardozo, in Nature of the
Judicial Process – part of the American legal cannon read by law students
for the past century – wrote,
[t]he rules and principles of case law have never been treated as
final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in those
great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice. Every new case
is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable
yields a result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered. …if
a rule continues to work injustice it will eventually be reformulated.
The principles themselves are continually retested; for if the rules
derived from a principle do not work well, the principle itself must
ultimately be re-examined.130
The experiment of colorblind jurisprudence has been tested. In testing,
reformulating, and re-examining rules and principles, Cardozo urged the
judiciary to take its time: “[t]his work of modification is gradual. Its effects
must be measured by decades and even centuries. Thus measured, they are
128
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seen to have behind them the power and the pressure of the moving
glacier.”131 One century after Plessy, we view its decision as archaic and
indefensible. Decades after Shaw, measuring its effects – the results are in
and the glaciers are melting. The culmination of colorblind jurisprudence is
a current political climate wrought with racial injustice. Today, we see a
sharp rise in white nationalist domestic terrorism, 132 rampant abuse of
children of color within immigration detention centers,133 state-sanctioned
violence against African Americans by law enforcement,134 environmental
justice and health disparities for communities of color within and beyond our
borders,135 and widespread voter suppression and political disintegration.136
Denying the very real and present danger of colorblind jurisprudence has not
afforded the legal system the comfort it had hoped to secure. Instead, it exists
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Alicia Garza, Black Love-Resistance and Liberation, 20(2) RP&E J., 21, 22 (2015)
(“State-sanctioned violence and anti-Black racism have shaped our physical, emotional,
economic, political, and cultural landscapes in profound ways that impact our ability to
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The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy and the Law, 65 J. LEGAL
ED. 381, 381-404 (2015); Black Lives Upended by Policing: The Raw Videos Sparking
Outrage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-race.html
[https://perma.cc/2E44-RD8X];
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Million, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2019); See The New York Times, What We Know About
the Fort Worth Police Shooting of Atatiana Jefferson, N.Y. TIMES, October 15, 2019
available at ; See Marina Trahan Martinez, Sarah Mervosh and John Eligon, Former
Dallas Police Officer Is Guilty of Murder for Killing Her Neighbor, October 2, 2019. The
Counted: People Killed by Police in the United States, THE GUARDIAN (last visited Nov.
7, 2019) available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/01/us/amber-guyger-trial-verdictbotham-jean.html [https://perma.cc/H2E9-MV8F].
135
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as an undiagnosed cultural illness. The legitimization of Shaw claims feeds
the virus.

CONCLUSION
I propose that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were never
founded on a belief that we would achieve a political system in which race
no longer mattered. Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section II
of the Fifteenth Amendment gave Congress power to enforce the
Amendments.137 It would not only be absurd but antithetical to draft such
legislation − which seeks to cure historical and present-day white supremacy
− without naming race, without analyzing race, without factoring race,
without race-consciousness. Logically and accordingly, the authorization of
legislation and remedies to enforce the 14th and 15th Amendments requires
race-consciousness.
It is intellectually disingenuous to state that at a time when white families
gathered on a Sunday afternoon to watch a lynching, when terrorism reigned
upon communities of color,138 when children feared their parents would be
killed exercising their right to vote, Congress intended the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments to be interpreted through a colorblind lens.
Applying the facts to the law requires the judiciary to interrogate the
narratives and examine the causes and conditions that create racial inequality
and human suffering. For those who have neglected to learn America’s
history of domestic terrorism against black and brown communities,
jurisprudence based on the aspiration of a society where race no longer
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U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation”); U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2. (“The Congress shall have the
power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”)
138
For a concise yet in-depth history of terrorism against Latinx communities between
1848-1928, see Oversight Of The Trump Administration’s Border Policies And The
Relationship Between Anti-Immigrant Rhetoric And Domestic Terrorism: Hearing Before
the Comm. On the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (Sept. 6, 2019) (Testimony of Monica Muñoz
Martinez, Ph.D.).
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matters is, in fact, a racial act. Toni Morrison poignantly declared,
“Statements…insisting on the meaninglessness of race to the American
identity are themselves full of meaning. The world does not become raceless
or will not become unracialized by assertion.”139 Refusing to see data of
America’s economic and political racial hierarchy will not manifest political
integration

of

historically

underrepresented

communities.

Political

integration is the true goal of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The
next Reconstruction − our current civil and human rights crisis − demands
eyes wide open.
Seventeenth-century French Archbishop Frances Fénelon counseled, “We
only perceive our malady when the cure begins.”140 The 1965 Voting Rights
Act and racially-conscious legislation and remedies authorized by Section V
of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section II of the Fifteenth Amendment are
the cures that allow us to perceive the malady of white supremacy. It is time
an independent and conscious judiciary allows the medicine to work its cure.
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